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Abstract—The concept of Industry 4.0 brings a disruption into
the processing industry. It is characterised by a high degree
of intercommunication, embedded computation, resulting in a
decentralised and distributed handling of data. Additionally,
cloud-storage and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) approaches en-
hance a centralised storage and handling of data. This often
takes place in third-party networks. Furthermore, Industry 4.0
is driven by novel business cases. Lot sizes of one, customer
individual production, observation of process state and progress
in real-time and remote maintenance, just to name a few. All of
these new business cases make use of the novel technologies.
However, cyber security has not been an issue in industry.
Industrial networks have been considered physically separated
from public networks. Additionally, the high level of uniqueness
of any industrial network was said to prevent attackers from
exploiting flaws. Those assumptions are inherently broken by
the concept of Industry 4.0. As a result, an abundance of attack
vectors is created. In the past, attackers have used those attack
vectors in spectacular fashions. Especially Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises (SMEs) in Germany struggle to adapt to these
challenges. Reasons are the cost required for technical solutions
and security professionals. In order to enable SMEs to cope with
the growing threat in the cyberspace, the research project IUNO
Insec aims at providing and improving security solutions that
can be used without specialised security knowledge. The project
IUNO Insec is briefly introduced in this work. Furthermore, con-
tributions in the field of intrusion detection, especially machine
learning-based solutions, for industrial environments provided by
the authors are presented and set into context.
Index Terms—IUNO Insec, Industrial IT Security, Machine
Learning, Industry 4.0, Cyber Security
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades, attacks on industrial systems
have increased in a spectacular manner [1]. Malicious actors,
supposedly state-sponsored and criminal groups, have taken
an interest in industrial organisations. Attacks on critical
infrastructures, such as the power grid in the Ukraine
in December 2015 [2], have a severe impact, potentially
matching a political agenda. Attributing these attacks,
however, is a non-trivial task [3], [4]. Espionage and sabotage
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to gain financial or technical benefits and hinder a competitor
are scenarios that need to be taken into consideration as
well. In Germany, hundreds of so-called hidden champions,
enterprises unknown by the customer but leading in their area,
exist [5]. Despite their importance for economy, they are often
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). Due to their
size, Information Technology (IT) security is commonly not
a priority. Investments in IT security are expensive in terms
of personnel and resources but do not provide measurable
revenue. Additionally, increases in IT security measures
are commonly perceived as a hindrance to productivity.
Non-technical requirements on IT security measures for
application in SMEs include ease of use, scalability and
usability by non-experts in the security field. The publicly
funded research project IUNO [6] aimed at providing such
measures in order for industrial enterprises to integrate them
into their production environments. After it was finshed,
the research project IUNO Insec [7] was established as a
succeeding research project. The scope is the improvement
and further development of the tools implemented in IUNO.
In this work, the research project IUNO Insec is presented.
Furthermore, different aspects of intrusion detection suitable
for industrial environments are presented. Apart from the IT
networks, industrial environments contain control networks
or Operation Technology (OT). Legacy protocols and security
not being a design target make OT networks vulnerable to
attackers. The usage of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) and
Cyber-Physical Production Systems (CPPSs) in OT networks
enables attackers to have an effect on the physical world by
means of the digital world.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows. In
Section II, a brief overview of the state of the art is pro-
vided. The research project IUNO Insec and its goals are
introduced in Section III. An exemplary summary of intrusion
detection methods developed for industrial use is presented
in Section IV. Potentially beneficial combinations of those
methods are discussed in Section V. This work is concluded
in Section VI.
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II. STATE OF THE ART
Due to the relevance of critical infrastructures on supply
chains and nations, the effects of incidents on production
and revenue and the dangers of digital attacks on phyiscal
systems, information security has gained importance in the
industrial community. Therefore, an industry focusing on in-
dustrial intrusion detection solutions has evolved. Additionally,
the research community has taken an interest in solutions
for industrial Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). After the
first work of Denning in 1987 [8], intrusion detection has
become established as a field of research and application. A
brief overview of intrusion detection approaches is provided
in Table I. Zhu discusses attacks on Supervisory Control And
TABLE I
APPLICATIONS OF ANOMALY DETECTION BY THE INDIVIDUAL WORKS
Subject Covered Research Work
Surveys & Taxonomies [9]–[11]
Wireless Networks [12], [13]
Industrial Networks [12], [14], [15]
IT Networks [16], [17]
Machine Learning-based [18], [19]
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems [9]. A summary of exist-
ing systems as well as challenges in anomaly-based network
intrusion detection is provided by Garcia-Teodoro et al. [10].
Lee and Stolfo provide an overview of data mining approaches
for intrusion detection [11]. Zhang et al. analyse techniques to
detect intrusions in mobile networks [13]. Detecting intrusions
in mobile ad-hoc networks is discussed by Zhang and Wenke as
well [20]. Shin et al. discuss intrusion detection for industrial
wireless networks [12]. This is motivatied by the increasing
relevance of wireless sensors, organised in so-called Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSNs). Industrial networks often contain
fixed sequences of operations. These can be exploited to
detect deviations, as performed by Caselli et al. [14]. Many
industrial networks contain legacy protocols that have to be
integrated into working intrusion detection solutions. Morris
et al. present an intrusion detection system to fit Modbus
communication [15]. Detection of intrusions in IT networks
is discussed by Northcutt and Novak [16]. Mukherjee et
al. present work on detecting intrusions in networks [17].
Mukkamala et al. employ neural networks and Support Vector
Machines (SVMs) to detect intrusions in the infamous Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Knowledge
Discovery in Databases (KDD) cup ’99 [18]. Ryan et al.
employ neural networks as well to detect intrusions [19].
III. ENTER IUNO INSEC
IUNO Insec [7] is the succeeding research project of the
national reference project for IT security in Industry 4.0
(IUNO) [6]. In IUNO, four application uses cases were ad-
dressed:
• Customer-individual production
• Technology data market place
• Remote maintenance
• Visual Security Control
These application use cases were derived in coordination with
the industrial partners, ensuring their relevance. Solutions were
developed, with different degrees of technology readiness.
They were then collected in the toolbox used to provide the
solutions to interested third parties. As the goal of IUNO
was to provide means to secure their digital assets to SMEs,
the toolbox was published. However, many solutions were
introduced by academic partners, lacking technology readiness
to be used as they were. In order to increase technology
readiness, refine the tools and adjust them to different ap-
plication use cases, the research project IUNO Insec was
established. The main areas of research and development in
IUNO Insec are shown in Figure 1. The two major security
controls addressed by IUNO Insec are detection and prevention
of malicious activities, meaning the goal is to either hinder an
attacker from performing malicious acts or detecting the pro-
cess of an attacker doing so. Other security controls, such as
recovery, prevention or correction are not in the scope of IUNO
Insec. Automated tools that actively engage in activities in an
industrial networks always contain the danger of negatively
influencing production. This could amount to enormous costs
and is thus undesirable in industrial use cases, as opposed to
home and office environments where short disruptions of the
productive system are tolerable. Since industrial environments
are commonly highly application specific, security solutions
need to be capable of abstracting and transferring functionality.
Furthermore, they need to be usable by non-experts while
still meeting functional and non-functional requirements of the
users. User-centric workshops are organised to ensure these
features.
IV. INDUSTRIAL INTRUSION DETECTION APPROACHES
In the course of research project IUNO, the German Re-
search Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI) has evaluated
and implemented several solutions to detecting anomalies in
industrial networks and processes. Anomalies are events in a
set of events that deviate with respect to certain features. Even
though the correspondence of an anomaly to an intrusion is
not always given and non-trivial to evaluate, anomalies are
events a human operator should take a look at. In this work,
analyses of packet-based intrusion detection are presented, as
well as time series-based anomaly detection in OT network
traffic and process data.
A. Packet-based Detection
Detecting intrusions based on features of singular network
packets is a well-researched method [21]. Each network packet
contains metainformation, such as source and destination,
size, ports and many more. Furthermore, each packet contains
a payload that, given it is not encrypted, can be used to
determine malicious intents. A special kind of packet-based
intrusion detection is Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) where
a sequence of packets is considered. This is relevant as
many attacks, e.g. the ACK-scan, rely on disruptions of the
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Fig. 1. Methods and Tools Addressed by IUNO Insec
sequences while not providing packets that are anomalous in
themselves.
In this work, data sets provided by Lemay and Fernandez are
evaluated with respect to packets [22]. They provided data sets
monitored in an emulated environment, simulation power cir-
cuit breakers with Modbus-based communication. In some data
sets, operations of a human were simulated. After monitoring,
different kinds of attacks were introduced to the data sets.
However, all attacks are TCP/IP-based, none exploits Modbus-
specific vulnerabilities as presented by Morris et al. [23]. The
data sets used in this work and their corresponding name in
the work of Lemay and Fernandez are listed in Table II. In a
TABLE II
DATA SETS USED AS PRESENTED BY Lemay and Fernandez
ID Name Len. (s) Attacks
DS1 Moving two files Modbus 6RTU 190 4
DS2 Send a fake command Modbus 6RTU with operate 670 1
DS3 CnC uploading exe modbus 6RTU with operate 70 2
previous work [24], these data sets have been evaluated with
four different anomaly detection algorithms:
• Random Forest
• SVM
• k-nearest Neighbour
• k Means Clustering
In order to evaluate the performance, the accuracy as shown
in (1) as well as the f1-score (2) that is based on precision (3)
and recall (4) are used.
accuracy =
tp + tn
tp + fp + tn + fn
(1)
F1 = 2 · precision · recall
precision+ recall
(2)
precision =
tp
tp + fp
(3)
recall =
tp
tp + fn
(4)
tp denotes the positive events that are classified correctly,
tn the negative ones that are classified correctly. fp and fn
denote the positive and negative events respectively that are
misclassified. The results are shown in Table III. It can be
seen that SVM and Random Forest perform very well with
near perfect scores, while k-nearest Neighbour performs well
in certain areas and k Means Clustering does not perform
satisfactorily at all, allowing too many false positives.
B. Time Series-based Detection in Network Traffic
Industrial network communication is expected to be highly
periodic. Processes produce repeating patterns in communica-
tion, the number and structure of entities communicating is
expected to stay constant. In order to detect deviations in the
time domain, time series anomaly detection was applied in
a previous work [25]. As an algorithm, Matrix Profiles were
TABLE III
RESULTS OF PACKET-BASED ANOMALY DETECTION
Algorithm Metric DS1 DS2 DS3
Random Forest
Acc. 1.0 0.99970 0.99997
F1 1.0 0.99985 0.99999
SVM
Acc. 1.0 1.0 0.99994
F1 1.0 1.0 0.99997
k-nearest Neighbour
Acc. 0.99710 0.99912 0.99941
F1 0.99853 0.99956 0.99971
k Means Clustering
Acc. 0.98102 0.55624 0.63362
F1 0.99038 0.71485 0.77573
used, as presented by Yeh et al. [26]. The concept of Matrix
Profiles is the calculation of distances between sequences of
length m. Any sequence of length m is compared to any
other sequence of length m. Then the minimal distance is
derived. Originally an algorithm for motif discovery, Matrix
Profiles can detect outliers if the minimal distance is high.
This indicates that a sequence was singular, being a hint
on anomalous behaviour. The minimal distances of packet
number, port and IP pairs of DS3 as defined in Table II is
shown in Figure 2. It shows that the Matrix Profiles can
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Fig. 2. Time Series-based Intrusion Detection in Industrial Network Traffic
be used to detect any attack with the black line showing a
minimal threshold value needed to create no false negatives.
The length of increases in minimal distance can be explained
with the window length m, as any attack influences all m
following sequences as well. However, automatically detecting
a threshold that performs well is a non-trivial challenge to be
solved.
C. Time Series-based Detection in Process Data
Apart from the network traffic characteristics, time series
can be used to detect deviations in the process behaviour. An
exemplary process using batch processing has been created
using real world hardware [27]. It is shown in Figure 3.
A pump is used to pump water from Container 102 to
Container 101. Due to natural reflow, the level of Container
101 decreases over time. A hysteresis value activates the pump
again once too much water has reflown. This process has been
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Fig. 3. Real-world Time Series of Process
the base for a simulated environment, introducing attacks to a
simulation of the same process [28]. The water flow as well
as the water level of Container 102 are shown in c. Normal
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Fig. 4. Time Series-based Intrusion Detection in Industrial Process Data
operation is pictured until packet number 4000. After that and
until packet 4800, the speed of reflow is doubled, halving the
periods of pump activity and the water level refill. The same
behaviour is shown again starting at packet number 6500 to
the end of the trace. Minimal distances as calculated with
Matrix Profiles rises significantly during the attacks as clearly
indicated in Figure 4. As a result, time series-based anomaly
detection methods are capable of detecting deviations and
anomalies in regular process behaviour that can be indicators
of attacks.
V. COMBINING THE PIECES
As discussed, attacks on industrial networks have to undergo
different stages [28]. First, the perimeter has to be breached,
commonly by phishing or other social engineering attacks.
This grants an attacker access to the IT network. The IT
network is commonly connected to OT networks by De-
Militarized Zones (DMZs), network segmentation and fire-
walls. Moving laterally from IT to OT networks is crucial
for attackers in order to execute the intended activity. If
the perimeter has been breached without triggering counter
measures, the lateral movement is the next phase of an attack
to be detected. A context-based aggregation model has been
introduced that allows for distributed collection of data in order
to determine sources, destinations and effects of attacks [29].
Context information can provide valuable insight on attacks
and aid in detecting anomalies [30].
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, the research project IUNO Insec was in-
troduced. It aims at providing much needed security solu-
tions for German industrial enterprises, especially SMEs that
cannot afford to build expertise themselves. The approach
of IUNO Insec includes the improvement and development
of easy to use security modules. Furthermore, approaches
to detect anomalies in an industrial context are discussed.
Industrial environments contain characteristic requirements for
security solutions as well as unique properties with respect to
topology and communication behaviour. This motivates the
use of certain technologies, such as time series or packet-
based analysis. Additionally, deceptive technologies, such as
feints, distraction and obfuscation [31] or honeypots [32] can
provide an additional layer of security to provide German
SMEs the means to securely participate in the fourth industrial
revolution.
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